论文

Regulation of Executive Compensation of SOEs: Empirical Evidence from China Stock Market

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作者

刘金全 (1964-),男,吉林大学数量经济研究中心教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向为宏观经济计量分析。

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Regulation of Executive Compensation of SOEs: Empirical Evidence from China Stock Market

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论文目录

  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
  • 3 Data and Methodology
    1. 3.1 Sample selection and setting of the event window
    2. 3.2 Regulation events and event windows
    3. 3.3 Estimation of market reaction
      1. 3.3.1 Estimation of normal return
      2. 3.3.2 The estimation of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
      3. 3.3.3 Executive compensation
      4. 3.3.4 Regression model
    4. 3.4 Monte-Carlo simulation analysis
  • 4 Empirical Results
    1. 4.1 Descriptive statistics
    2. 4.2 Regression results
    3. 4.3 Monte-Carlo simulation analysis
  • 6 Conclusions
    1. Acknowledgments

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